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Abstract 
We looked into Pakistan’s central bank response to the foreign exchange inflows, for the period 
from 2001:01 to 2007:06, to strike a balance between competing goals of internal and external 
equilibriums to draw lessons for its conduct going forward. Using a reaction function we tested 
the hypothesis that SBP fully sterilized its foreign exchange interventions. The results indicated 
that for this period, SBP only partially neutralized its foreign exchange interventions.  In 
addition, we also found that changes in SBP’s domestic credit were counter cyclical as it had 
negative relation with the output gap.  However, the changes in domestic credit were found to 
have positive relation with changes in inflation. This probably resulted from too much weight 
assigned to growth objective in the back drop of recession and low inflation environment at the 
start of 2001.  It was also found that the SBP also change its domestic credit systematically to 
reduce interest rate variability at the short end.   
  
1.1:  Introduction 
Since 2000 the emerging economies had experienced a surge in foreign exchange inflows 
followed by massive interventions by their central banks to prevent currency appreciation 
[Mohanty and Turner (2005)]. Pakistan was no exception as it also experienced a similar 
increase in the inflows since 2001.  This resulted in reversal of established market expectations 
of devaluation of currency and accordingly rupee started to appreciate.  The relatively huge 
volume of inflows forced the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market to keep the parity between Pak Rupee and US Dollar stable.
1
 As a consequence SBP 
accumulated significant foreign exchange reserves.  As a result, ample domestic liquidity was 
generated.  The interest rates fell to historically low levels during 2001 to 2007 and private sector 
credit grew very rapidly.  Real GDP grew, on average, by 5.7 percent during this period. 
Inflation, which was below 4.0 percent in the period from 2001 to 2005, started to accelerate  
afterwards but still remained within single digit up till 2008.       
However, Pakistan experienced a balance of payment (BOP) crisis and inflation soared to a 
record level in Fiscal Year (FY)08 and FY09.  After adopting a macroeconomic stabilization 
program, BOP has improved slightly and stabilized.  It is expected that in future Pakistan will 
experience significant foreign exchange inflows due to official pledges by Friends of Democratic 
Pakistan, pickup in economic activity and improved sentiments of foreign investors towards the 
country.  The conduct of central bank in managing these inflows will determine the 
macroeconomic stability in medium term. Therefore, it is worth investigating the conduct of 
monetary policy in years prior to the current BOP crisis when inflows were significant and to see 
                                                 
1
 Since there were large inflows from US and Europe by expat Pakistanis, it was feared that these are one off 
transfers and as soon as the situation gets better, these inflows would shrink substantially. Therefore to shield the 
external sector from this perceived volatility in exchange rate, SBP intervened in the market.  
what lessons we could draw.  Despite many pertinent questions, this paper, however, will narrow 
its focus to enquire the following issues: was SBP able to isolate its domestic credit from balance 
of payment consideration through sterilization of its foreign exchange intervention? What policy 
options could it had? And how was its conduct regarding its competing statutory goal of 
achieving growth and price stability?    
According to impossible trilemma, a country opting for greater financial integration with the rest 
of the world must give up exchange rate stability if it wishes to preserve monetary 
independence.
2
 Many developing countries adopted the policy of managed float to reduce the 
exchange rate volatility and to preserve some degree of monetary independence [Aizenman and 
Glick (2008)].  Central banks can intervene in foreign exchange markets to contain currency 
appreciation for some time because there is no limit to the volume of domestic currency they can 
sell in forex markets. There is also a view that significant intervention for extended period shall 
eventually wane domestic macroeconomic performance presenting the central banks with a 
policy impasse [Mohanty and Turner (2005)]. This is because of the fact that the intervention in 
the foreign exchange market complicates the balancing between monetary and exchange rate 
policies as the situation could arise where the central bank would like to achieve competing goals 
of resisting currency appreciation and controlling inflationary pressures. If so, injection of 
liquidity due to foreign exchange interventions could cause difficulties for the conduct of 
monetary policy.  
These interventions in foreign exchange market can be sterilized or nonsterilized. Sterilized 
intervention occurs when central bank acts to offset the effects of a change in its foreign 
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 The Trilemma states that a country can opt any two of the following three goals simultaneously: monetary 
independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration. 
exchange holdings on the monetary base.
3
 Compared to this, nonsterilized intervention occurs 
when the central bank buy or sell foreign exchange, against domestic currency without such 
counterbalance actions [Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996)]. There is an agreement in literature that 
nonsterilized intervention can manipulate the exchange rate in a similar way as monetary policy 
by inducing changes in the stock of the monetary base which, in turn, induces changes in broader 
monetary aggregates, interest rates, market expectations and eventually the exchange rate. 
However, the efficacy of sterilized intervention is very controversial, therefore the debate on the 
effectiveness of official intervention in the foreign exchange market mostly relates to sterilized 
intervention [Sarno and Taylor (2001)].  
Obstfeld (1982b) observed that if sterilized intervention does influence the exchange rate, then it 
could be considered as a second policy instrument along with the domestic credit policy, through 
which monetary authority can simultaneously achieve its internal and external targets in short 
run. Obstfeld (1982a,b) and Sarno and Taylor (2001) indicated that for the sterilized intervention 
to succeed in achieving its objective of accomplishing independent external and internal targets; 
domestic and foreign assets must be imperfect substitutes in the private portfolio.
4
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 Sterilized intervention is a combination of two transactions. First the central bank conducts a non-sterilized 
intervention by buying foreign currency with home currency. This results in the increase in monetary base.  Then the 
central bank sterilizes the effect on monetary base by selling a corresponding quantity of home currency 
denominated bonds to soak up the initial increase in the monetary base. [Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) chapter 8] 
4
 This view relates to the portfolio balance theory channel for the effectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange 
intervention. If domestic and foreign assets are regarded by agents as perfect substitutes, sterilized intervention may 
have no significant result on the exchange rate. This is because people will be uninterested regarding the relative 
amounts of domestic and foreign assets, they are holding. They would only care about the total amount and therefore 
no change in the relative quantities of domestic and foreign assets in their portfolios. Consequently, there will be no 
change in market clearing prices. And for domestic and foreign assets to be imperfect substitutes; there must be 
some kind of risk premium. 
If so, sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market should be a preferred way for the 
central banks to accomplish both its monetary and exchange rate targets. However, Mohanty and 
Turner (2005) argued that achieving the independent monetary and exchange rate policies goals 
are only possible when the intervention is small or when it is expected that the situation will 
reverse quickly.  
Given that the SBP intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market, gauging the efficiency of 
its interventions is a subject of empirical investigation. However, as mentioned earlier the debate 
on the effectiveness of official intervention in the foreign exchange market mostly relates to 
sterilized intervention [Sarno and Taylor (2001)], therefore, before such an empirical 
investigation could be done, we ought to determine whether or not SBP sterilized its 
interventions and to what extent? So the one objective of this paper is to understand the extent of 
sterilization of the foreign exchange intervention in the period under study to ascertain the 
success of SBP in isolating its domestic credit from balance of payment consideration.  In 
addition, we would try to investigate the behavior of the SBP with respect to various objectives 
of its monetary policy.  For instance, SBP’s statutory mandate requires it to formulate policies 
which should focus on growth and price stability.   Malik and Ahmed (2007) investigated SBP’s 
monetary policy reaction function by considering short end interest rate as an operational target 
and found that in addition to these two objective of price stability and growth, the SBP also 
focused on short run interest rate smoothing as an objective in its reaction function.  However, 
many SBP publications have identified that instead of short end interest rates, SBP had been 
targeting the monetary aggregates as an operational target.  
Therefore, to investigate these questions empirically, a reaction function is developed in terms of 
domestic credit as an operational target. The estimation of the reaction function was done using 
generalized method of moments (GMM) technique for the monthly data for the period 2001:1 to 
2007:06. This technique is selected so as to take in to account the endogeneity problem between 
the changes in domestic credit and the various arguments of the reaction function such as the 
changes in foreign reserves, inflation and interest rate smoothing.  
1.2:  Monetary and exchange rate policies in historical perspective: 
Nineties was a difficult decade for Pakistan economy. Economic growth slowed down due to 
various factors namely: political uncertainties, weather calamities and structural constraints.  
This situation further deteriorated in late nineties when Pakistan went nuclear and attracted 
economic sanctions from the international community.  However, it was the external sector of 
the economy that suffered the most.  The significant foreign exchange inflows of 1980s dried 
down after the end of Afghan war against the former USSR.  That put the economic system of 
the country under severe strain.  In the mean time, rising current account deficit that resulted 
from increase in domestic absorption and loss of competitiveness caused fall in international 
reserves. Consequently, the central bank was forced to frequently devalue domestic currency 
during nineties in order to correct current account imbalances (see Annex Table 1.A for selected 
economic indicators).
 5
    
After enduring a painful decade of low growth and contractionary demand management policies, 
Pakistan’s economic performance started to improve after 2000. Fiscal deficit was contained 
within the so called sustainable limit, inflation was low, and there was steady accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves. In short, macroeconomic fundamentals were generally back on track. 
As part of stabilization program, Pakistan’s central bank allowed a free float for its currency and 
dismantled the Rupee band that had been in place during FY00.  As a result, rupee depreciated 
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 For details, see Janjua (2004), History of The State Bank of Pakistan 1988-2003 Chapter 7 for more details.  
by 23.8 percent during the year. Consequently the trade deficit fell. In order to augment its 
reserves, the SBP purchased US$ 2157 million from kerb market. Instead of direct intervention 
and moving the Rupee/Dollar band, monetary policy was the main tool to quell episodes of 
speculation in foreign exchange market and to smooth out the volatility caused by lumpy 
payments.   
Post September 11, 2001; Pakistan experienced large inflows of foreign exchange and a 
consequent build up of foreign reserves and appreciation of the real effective exchange rate.  It 
would seem that external factors played a crucial role in bringing home these foreign exchange 
inflows. Most noteworthy was the big upsurge in workers’ remittances through official channels 
that resulted from the global crack down on illegal channels of money transfer. This led to the 
collapse of the Hundi system and disapperance of kerb market premium over official rate. 
Another contributing factor was the reversal of capital flight as the balances of Pakistani 
nationals came under scrutiny abroad.  In addition, debt rescheduling and new large aid inflows 
to Pakistan for siding with the US and its allies in the war against terror augmented the net 
inflows  
The tremendous improvement in Pakistan’s external sector post September 2001, either directly 
or indirectly, contributed to positive developments for many macroeconomic indicators. For 
instance, workers’ remittances almost doubled during FY02 in comparison with previous year to 
reach at US$ 2.39 billion. Together with increased official transfers, these inflows allowed SBP 
to augment its foreign exchange reserves and therefore perhaps a need to sterilize its impact on 
base money. Moreover, the current account recorded a surplus and underpinned the 6.2 percent 
appreciation of Pakistan Rupee.  Indeed the purchases allowed the SBP to stabilize the exchange 
rate.  The rationale for SBP intervention in foreign exchange market for slowing down of rupee 
appreciation was the fear that this upsurge in inflows might be temporary.  In short, while FY01 
SBP foreign exchange interventions were to support Rupee, the FY02 buying was essentially to 
prevent it from strengthening too sharply.
6
   
Furthermore the rupee liquidity injected through the foreign exchange purchases enabled SBP to 
ease its monetary policy which was contrary to FY01 when monetary policy was kept tight to 
support Rupee.  Interestingly however, SBP reserve money growth was contained to only 9.6 
percent, as injections through SBP foreign exchange purchases were sterilized by a net 
retirement of SBP’s government securities holdings.  The process of SBP-NDA reduction was 
particularly very intriguing, as the increased market liquidity (against SBP intervention) was 
neutralized without actually pursuing any explicit instrument for sterilization.  Specifically, 
while most of the increased market liquidity was being channeled to the government securities, 
the government was retiring SBP-debt using borrowings from commercial banks.  This resulted 
into a reduction of SBP-NDA.  Hence, what seems to be a shift in domestic debt structure of the 
government actually helped the SBP’s efforts to restrict monetary base expansion.7  
In a sense, the sterilization pursued by SBP is not very different from open market operations: 
while this process shifts the SBP holdings of government securities to commercial banks 
indirectly, the open market operation achieves similar results directly.  Looking at sterilization 
during FY02, the retirement of Rs 287 billion worth of government securities with SBP more 
than offset the impact of SBP intervention in the foreign exchange market.  Consequently, as 
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 In FY01, the SBP injected doller liquidity into the interbank market to lower volatility and meet lumpy payments.  
The SBP was net seller in interbank market during FY01.  
7
 The practice of sterilization had cost for SBP in terms of foregone interest earning on government securities etc.  In 
addition, this could have increased quasi fiscal cost for government.  However, low private sector credit demand left 
ample liquidity with the banks resulting in switch of government debt from SBP to banks without putting much 
pressure on interest. However we ignore this discussion here because it is not in the scope of this paper.   
mentioned above, the reserve money growth was held down to 9.6 percent despite sizeable 
foreign exchange purchases by SBP.
8
   
The FY03 also witnessed current account surplus owing to reduction in trade deficit and 
phenomenal increase in worker remittances to the tune of US$ 4237 million.  SBP intervened 
heavily to stabilize the Rupee/Dollar parity by not letting it to appreciate too quickly.  Indeed we 
can characterize this policy to be a pseudo free float, as SBP never allowed the Rupee to move 
freely.  The SBP conceded that exchange rate practically acted as a nominal anchor for the 
monetary policy, which was discount rate during previous year.  In contrast to FY02 position, 
when SBP essentially mopped up rupee liquidity resulting from its forex market interventions, 
FY03 saw a very deliberate reduction in these sterilization operations, despite a sharper rise in 
forex purchases (See SBP Annual Report FY03).  This resulting liquidity flooding the banking 
system raised competitive pressures and led directly to fall in interest rates.  As a result of low 
sterilization effort, reserve money grew by 14.5 percent without resulting in inflationary 
pressures, which can be attributed to lags in inflation dynamics.   
During FY04, although net forex inflows declined relatively, the SBP continued with its loose 
monetary stance. In fact, net credit to private sector grew by Rupee 325 billion, which was more 
than twice the cumulative net credit expansion in preceding three years. The negative of this 
expansionary policy was the rise of inflationary expectation.  Headline inflation measured by 
CPI was at 4.6 percent.  This coupled with the reduction in unilateral inflows of foreign 
exchange put pressure on Rupee to depreciate.
9
    All of these resulted in the upward pressure on 
interest rates.  With relatively low inflows and deliberate expansionary monetary policy, 
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 SBP Annual Report for FY02.   
9
 Saudi oil facility ended this year. 
sterilization effort was on the lower side. As the Governor of the SBP stated “Despite some 
mopping up, the Central Bank has left excess liquidity with the banks which has driven down the 
cost of credit to historically low levels of 5 percent average. The banks are, therefore, reaching 
out to new customers particularly the middle and lower income groups by providing them 
agriculture credit, SME loans, mortgage loans and consumer loans. This is the most direct way 
the reserve accumulation is benefiting the common man….”10 
However, with inflation peaking at 9.3 percent, SBP had to switch to tightening of monetary 
stance during FY05.  This shift in policy was more pronounced during second half of the FY05, 
with the benchmark 6-month T-bill yield rising by 416 basis points during this period, as against 
166 basis points increase in first half of the same year.  However, despite this rise in interest rates 
monetary growth remained high at 19.3 percent.  Current account deficit was recorded at US$ 
1.4 billion, which stemmed mainly from trade deficit of US$6.2 billion during the year.  
However, worker remittances of US$4.0 billion helped finance this deficit.  On net basis, SBP 
was a seller of foreign exchange in market (Figure 1.1).  This aggressive selling was to defend 
the rupee from falling.  Throughout the year and afterwards, SBP remained an active player in 
the foreign exchange market.  
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 A paper presented at Pakistan Administrative Staff College on March 11, 2004 by Dr. Ishrat Hussain, Governor, 
State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
  
1.3:  Literature Review 
Central bank intervention following foreign exchange inflows has direct implications for the 
stance of monetary policy and the exchange rate. The coordination between two policies is 
achieved through sterilization. But the close coordination with monetary policy that sterilized 
intervention assumes may not be easy to achieve in practice.  
In particular, intervention to resist appreciation might confuse the market when the central bank 
is raising interest rates to fight inflationary pressure. Truman (2003) raises the concern about 
distraction risk which means that the authorities might be tempted to postpone fundamental 
adjustments hoping that intervention will succeed. He shows that during the late 1970s 
intervention against a weak dollar was primarily used as a substitute for monetary tightening in 
the United States. But the delay in tightening monetary policy eventually led to a sharp rise in 
inflation and the need to raise interest rates to a very high level. The tighter monetary policy, in 
turn, led to one of the worst recessions in US postwar history. 
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Figure 1.3: Net Foreign exchange purchases
Source: State Bank of Pakistan
igure 1.1: Foreig  Exchange Purchases  
Many economists have argued that intervention should be restricted to cases where it is 
consistent with the central bank’s inflation forecast. This means that foreign exchange 
intervention should only be done when it is consistent with monetary policy goals. For instance, 
intervention to resist depreciation should be done where there is a forecast that inflation would 
rise above the target during the targeting horizon in case the depreciation materialized. Similarly, 
the central bank should intervene to resist appreciation only when inflation is expected to fall 
below the target. Holub (2004) argues that in the Czech Republic such coordination has been 
maintained since the introduction of inflation targeting in 1998. The most of the interventions 
against currency appreciation were carried out when (a) inflation was expected to fall below the 
target and (b) the output gap was negative. 
Another strand of literature is concerned with the monetary authorities’ ability to conduct 
sterilized intervention on a sustained basis. The first issue is that of the impossible trinity which 
asserts that with no capital controls, the central bank cannot indefinitely control both the nominal 
exchange rate and the money market rate [Mundell (1968)]. If intervention is to prevent 
depreciation, such a limit will be often set by the reserves and contingency credit lines available 
to a country. Depleting reserves will make an interest rate increase inevitable. On the other hand, 
a domestic credit expansion aimed at affecting internal markets cause a weakening of exchange 
rate through inflationary expectations. To maintain the official parity, the central bank must 
intervene in the foreign exchange market by buying high powered money with foreign reserves 
thereby offsetting the expansionary impact of domestic credit. If the offset to domestic credit 
expansion is complete, the monetary base is determined independently of the central bank’s 
policies by the saving and portfolio decisions of the public. When the exchange rate is flexible, 
the level of exchange rate is determined by the supply and demand of currency. In this system, 
the nominal money supply becomes a policy determined variable.  However, the central bank can 
affect the monetary base in both cases, only when domestic and foreign assets are imperfect 
substitutes.
11
 If there is perfect substitutability, the net foreign assets offset to domestic credit 
measures is immediate and complete, provided there are no lags in portfolio adjustments 
[Obstfeld (1982a)].  
Second, the imperfect substitutability among assets means that changes in the supplies of such 
assets as a result of sterilization affect relative prices. For instance, Argy and Murray (1985) 
indicated that the central bank sells domestic bonds to sterilize its foreign exchange intervention. 
If domestic assets whose yield carries a risk premium; are imperfect substitutes of foreign assets, 
the authorities would have to pay higher interest rates on their sterilization bonds to encourage 
people to switch out of foreign assets.  
Calvo et al (1993) argued on the un-sustainability of the sterilization effort.  For instance 
resisting currency appreciation would prevent the domestic money market interest rate from 
falling, thereby would attract more inflows and thus continuously increase the need for 
sterilization. Eventually, the cost of sterilization would rise to high levels, forcing central bank to 
abandon sterilization effort; thereby leading to exchange rate appreciation. Therefore according 
to them, sterilization is difficult and costly. In the long run, appreciation of domestic currency 
value becomes unavoidable.  It is also because with no sterilization, falling in interest rates and 
the resulting increase in inflation will lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
This argument is empirically validated by several studies.  Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) 
document evidences during the early 1990s and argued that large scale sterilized intervention had 
caused sharp increases in short-term interest rates in countries with high inflation history.  In 
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 Assets can be imperfect substitute due to the presence of risk premium.  
Chile, the short-term interest rate (30 to 89 day bank lending rate) rose from about 28% in the 
period (1988-89) preceding capital inflows to over 46% during the period (January to July 1990) 
of heavy inflows and sterilization. The rise in interest rates was as dramatic in Colombia, with 
prime lending rates of banks more than doubling from 22% during the pre-inflow period (1989-
90) to over 47% during the peak of sterilization (January to November 1991). They concluded 
that “sterilization policies were either abandoned or scaled back or complemented by capital 
controls, as it became evident that the high domestic interest rates were attracting more inflows”. 
Finally, the high costs of issuing high yield local currency debt to acquire low yielding reserves 
can exacerbate fiscal deficits and so threaten macroeconomic stability. This issue is particularly 
serious if the country is already under large public sector debts. If trend continues, the 
combination of high costs and increasing reserves may provide a signal to markets that policy is 
unsustainable. Calvo (1991) argued that such effects would eventually weaken central banks’ 
credibility by raising the probability of debt monetization and consequent high inflation. 
Comparing the high interest rate differentials of Chile and Colombia with Argentina, which 
followed a policy of nonsterilized intervention during the early 1990s, Calvo et al (1993) 
questioned the desirability of sterilized intervention because it raised debt service costs at a time 
when countries were attempting to bring domestic debt expansion under control.  
Reisen (1993), however, argued that sterilization is easier than suggested otherwise. He asserts 
that some Asian countries have been able to achieve the impossible trinity of open financial 
markets, fixed exchange rates and the monetary independence through capital controls. Frankel 
(1994) examines the issue of foreign exchange inflows and the ability of the monetary authorities 
to conduct sterilized intervention. He concludes that sterilization is expensive when the cause of 
the capital inflows is a rise in money demand or an increase in exports. Attempts to sterilize such 
inflows would raise interest rates, leading to even larger inflows, thereby rendering the sterilization 
practice as difficult and expensive. On the other hand, when the source of foreign exchange 
inflows is an external shock, sterilized intervention is not likely to alter the interest rates and 
hence it can be a viable option in the short run. 
In short, possible consequences of prolonged sterilization could be that it could undermine 
monetary objectives; it could compromise financial stability; and it could impose heavy 
financing costs on the monetary authorities. Despite the possibility of these consequences and the 
concerns about coordination between intervention and monetary policy, monetary authorities do 
engage in sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market.  Since, failure to sterilize 
market intervention and the consequent increase in domestic liquidity can result in inflation as 
well as unwanted movement in exchange rate. In addition, the real exchange rate is also 
influenced by the ability of central banks to sterilize. Under these circumstances, determining the 
sterilization coefficients could be useful in terms of measuring of the scope and the stance of the 
monetary policy. Indeed, this issue has been discussed and empirically tested in the literature by 
several authors.  
Argy and Kouri (1972) estimated the sterilization coefficient by two-stage least squares using 
instrumental variables. They found evidence of partial sterilization on part of Germany and the 
Netherlands, but inconclusive evidence for Italy.  Kouri and Porter (1974) developed a model of 
international capital flows and applied it to the data of Germany, The Netherlands, Australia and 
Italy.  The offset coefficient which measures the extent, to which capital flows offset policy 
induced changes in monetary base, were statistically significant in all cases.  The estimates were 
-0.77 for Germany, -0.59 for Netherlands, -0.47 for Australia, and -0.43 for Italy.  All these 
estimates are statistically different from minus one, which suggested that sterilization was 
possible in these countries at least in short run. 
Miller and Askin (1976) examines the degree to which the balance of payment of two small, 
relatively open economies influence the ability of their monetary authorities to control the money 
supply.  More specifically, they investigate to what extent variations in the domestic components 
of monetary base are offset via international payment imbalances, and then to what extent the 
authorities sterilize the effect of payments imbalances on monetary base.  They built a simple 
model that incorporates the monetary approach to the balance of payments for Brazil and Chile.  
They used the reduced-form solutions and two stage-least square regressions to tackle the issues 
of simultaneity between (a) changes in the international and domestic components of the 
monetary base and (b) the level of income and the monetary base.  The empirical results 
concluded that only a relatively small portion of changes in domestic component of monetary 
base was offset through the balance of payments while authorities completely sterilized the 
impact of payments imbalance on monetary base. Their results suggest that the monetary 
authority in these countries had almost complete control over money supply.  However, Sheehey 
(1980) used an alternative specification of Miller and Askin (1976) model and suggested a 
limited ability of monetary authorities to influence the money supply. 
Kamas (1986) used a reduced form equation derived from a general macroeconomic model. 
Kamas made estimations in the context of three different specifications: the monetarist, the 
portfolio balance, and Keynesian for the period of 1971:03 to 1981:4 for Mexico and for the 
period of 1970:4 to 1982:04 for Venezuela. The sterilization coefficient came out to be -1.55 and 
-1.04 respectively for Mexico and Venezuela.  
Altınkemer (1997) estimates the domestic credit reaction function of Central Bank of Turkey 
(CBRT) by dividing the estimation period into two sub-periods, February 1990-October 1993 
and April 1994-June 1997. Study concludes that, during the pre-financial crisis period, it seems 
that the CBRT was reacting to changes in net foreign assets (NFA), real exchange rate and not to 
interest differential. While in the post financial crisis period, it seems that the CBRT reacted 
more to NFA changes compared to the pre-crisis period and also interest rate differentials gained 
importance in the monetary policy framework. The sterilization coefficients have been found as 
0.82 and 0.91 for the first and second periods respectively by using OLS. 
Another study for Turkey on the same subject by Celasun et al, (1999) computed the sterilization 
coefficients.  They used two-stage least squares, for the period February 1990 to June 1996, 
wherein the reaction function allows net domestic assets to respond to other variables, such as, 
net foreign assets, real exchange rate, real GDP and consolidated government deficit. For the 
whole period, the sterilization coefficient was found as -0.37, which indicated partial sterilization 
of 37 percent of reserve inflows. 
Emir et al (2000) estimated monetary policy reaction function for Turkey and calculated the 
offset and sterilization coefficient using simultaneous equation system for the periods of 1990 to 
1993 and 1995 to 1999. The results showed that in the first period which is the pre-crisis period 
(1990-1993), low degree of sterilization, offset and neutralization coefficients, which suggest 
that the CBRT implemented a relatively accommodative policy to fiscal policy by expanding 
domestic credits to finance budget deficit. In contrast, in the second period which is the post-
crisis period (1995-1999), the CBRT implemented more active policy by sterilizing most of the 
foreign assets increase and neutralizing the government credits by reducing the banking sector 
credits which was reflected in the high level of sterilization, offset and neutralization coefficient.  
Siklos (2000) focused on short run impact of sterilization on monetary policy and found that 
Central Bank of Hungary (NBH) fully sterilized capital inflows during 1992:01 to 1997:03 and 
the sterilization coefficient thus found was 1.002 by using OLS method. 
Patnaik (2004) used error correction procedure to analyze the sterilization practice of Reserve 
bank of India (RBI) using monthly data for period April 1993 to December 2003.  The result 
suggests that RBI directly sterilized its currency intervention by a reduction in net domestic 
assets. However, though the extent of sterilization was large, it was not complete and the 
coefficient was estimated to be -0.8. 
Korea witnessed surge in capital inflows and improvement in current account in early 90s.  
During this period, Bank of Korea actively intervened into the foreign exchange market and 
balances the monetary impact of foreign exchange interventions through sterilization.  Kim 
(1991) estimated 90 percent sterilization of increase in net foreign assets during the 1980s. 
Cavoli and Rajan (2005) estimated sterilization coefficients for Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Philippines for the monthly observation for the period January 1990 to March 
1997. The estimates for Korea (-1.11) suggest possible over-sterilization as the coefficient 
exceeds -1 and those for Indonesia are lower than the others at -0.76. The estimates for Thailand 
(-0.91), Malaysia (-0.94) and Philippines (-0.97) suggests almost complete sterilization of 
inflows.  
In other studies on the issues, Renhack and Mondino (1988) and Clavijo (1986) for Colombia; 
Blejer and Leiderman (1981) for Brazil; Fry et al (1991) for Pacific Basin Countries; Savvides 
(1998) for West and Central African countries, the sterilization coefficients were estimated to 
measure the coordination of monetary and exchange rate policy 
Qayyum and Khan (2003) used the domestic policy reaction function to gauge the degree of 
sterilization by investigating the long run relationship using cointegration technique for Pakistan.  
They used quarterly data from 1982Q3 to 2001Q2 and concluded that State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP) did sterilize 72 percent of capital inflows for the period.    
1.4: Theoretical Framework 
To capture the SBP’s reaction to policy choices in the face of foreign exchange inflows, we form 
a simple Aggregate Demand -Aggregate Supply model. Aggregate supply is represented by 
expectations augmented Phillips curve, where agents have adaptive learning and nominal rigidity 
makes policy effective. Modeling strategy was essentially Neo-Keynesian Transmission 
Mechanism with back ward looking pricing as described by Cukierman (2002). Model was 
modified to explicitly take into account IS-LM frame work with an equation describing the 
exchange rate.  Svensson (1996) notes that despite simplicity, this type of model captures some 
of the essential features of the more elaborate econometric models used by central banks.  As 
Cukierman (2002) states that this model reflects the declared belief of central banks that current 
policy interest rates affects the output gap with a lag of one period and rate o inflation with a lag 
of two periods.  
Consider the following expectations augmented Phillips curve equation  
     
           
      
     
          
      
Where    is natural rate of unemployment and   is the unemployment rate in the economy. 
          is inflation in period t.    is log of consumer price index at period t. coefficient   
is assumed to be negative implicating that a positive unemployment gap in current period would 
result in decreased inflation rate in the next period. Finally   is independently and identically 
distributed supply shocks.  
In above equation, Inflation in period t is considered to be a function of inflationary expectations 
for period t and the deviation of lagged unemployment rate from the natural rate.    
In adaptive expectations, expected inflation rate is weighted average of past inflation rates with 
maximum weight attached to the near past.   
  
                         
        
Where   is parameter representing speed of adjustment. 
Assuming, for simplicity,    , we get 
  
       
Substituting this in Phillips curve equation, we get 
                
      
The second term on right hand side of above equation can be replaced by deviation of employed 
labor force from natural rate. 
          
      
 
  
     
In our model output is produced using only labor. This is consistent with McCallum and Nelson 
(1999) who showed that there is very little connection between changes in capital stock and 
those of aggregate output over the business cycle. A typical year’s investment is small compared 
to existing stock of capital, and due to small correlation between capital and output, above 
assumption is appropriate.  Output is produced using labor according to following Cobb-Douglas 
production function 
        
Substituting the value of N from production function into Phillips curve equation, we get  
         
 
 
 
    
    
 
   
 
      
 
 
 
    
          
      
 
  
     
                 
Where      is percentage deviation of lagged output from the potential level is output gap.  
Above equation can be written one period forward as  
                     (1) 
Where coefficient   is assumed to be positive implicating that a positive output gap in period t 
would result increase in inflation rate in next period. 
Following Dornbusch (1976) we use standard open economy IS-LM frame work to represent 
demand side of the economy. All variables except interest rates are in log form.  
            
             (i) 
Equation (i) defines a standard IS relation: aggregate demand depends positively on terms of 
trade and negatively on the interest rate. Equation (i) can be written as 
            
               
            
                (ii) 
                   (iii) 
Equation (iii) is a standard LM equation.  
     
             (iv) 
Equation (iv) is interest parity condition which states that arbitrage by risk neutral agents keeps 
the domestic interest rates equal to foreign interest rate plus any expected gain that can be had by 
holding assets in foreign currency.  
From (iii) 
    
 
 
     
 
 
          
Substituting in (ii) 
            
         
 
 
     
 
 
               
            
                
 
 
             
    
  
        
  
            
       
 
                  
             
                       
Where    
  
       and    
 
       
             
                   
                                
          (2) 
Following Svensson (1996) long run natural output level is normalized to 1. So    in above 
equation denotes log of output relative to log of potential output (output gap).   is assumed to be 
positive indicating that an increase in real money supply in period t will result in positive output 
gap in period t+1. This also means that changes in money supply would impact inflation with a 
lag of two periods.   
Equation (1) can be written as  
                        
Substituting   from equation (2)  
                                         
               
                                           
               
Substituting (1)… 
                                                    
         
       
                                           
                      
                                 
                      
Where               
       
            
       
Taking expectation, we get 
                                    
       (3) 
Now we assume that central bank conducts its monetary policy such that the rate of inflation 
does not go beyond a certain threshold level (say    .  That means, the central bank will choose 
the value of its instrument (                 in next two periods to minimize 
   
   
   
         
   represents the conditional expectations based on the information available in period t.    is 
discount factor and its value is assumed to lie between 0 and 1.  
         
 
 
       
    is the period loss function. 
The first order condition is  
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Substituting (3) in (4) 
                                
   
        
                       
   
Adding and subtracting      on RHS. 
       
 
  
                
  
  
   
  
  
        
   
Substituting the values of                
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Where  
 
     
 
     
 
 
  
    
  
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
From interest parity condition (iv)  
         
      
Substituting in (5) 
                
                    
        
   
                                  
      
      
    (6) 
We also know that the identity   
             
The NFA is the net foreign assets, while the NDA is the net domestic assets of the central bank. 
                
Substituting this relation in to (6), we get 
                                    
      
      
         (7) 
                               
      
      
          (8) 
Where given the fact that    is some target which does not change, the    
  and     
  are foreign 
inflation and interest rates which can be taken as exogenous. Therefore we assume        
  
       1  = 0 as an intercept. 
                                       (9)  
The estimatable form of equation (9) can be as 
                                          (10) 
The coefficient of             our prime interest which will be (-1) if there is perfect 
sterilization of central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market.  It would mean that 
domestic money supply is kept independent of foreign inflows as a conscious policy.  Under 
such circumstances, domestic money is independent of balance of payment swings and is entirely 
determined by other factors.  This also means that central bank can potentially strive to achieve 
internal and external equilibrium simultaneously; provided that the sterilized intervention 
impacts the exchange rate as discussed by Obstfeld (1982b). If so, the central bank would have 
two instruments to achieve two competing goals, at least in the short run. It is important to 
recognize that the finding that the monetary authority completely sterilized its foreign exchange 
intervention does not provide evidence that these interventions have an impact on exchange rate. 
According to portfolio balance theory, the efficacy of foreign exchange intervention happens if 
the domestic and foreign bonds/assets are imperfect substitutes. In that case, sterilized foreign 
exchange intervention when used in combination with domestic credit expansion, enables 
monetary authority to lower the nominal interest rates in the short run, while holding the 
exchange rate constant [Obstfeld (1982b)]. It is worth noting that information about the efficacy 
of interventions cannot be obtained from the reaction function of the SBP as it only describes the 
behavior of the authorities. Question of efficiency only arise, if the sterilization is complete. As 
Sarno and Taylor (2001) mentioned that there is consensus in the literature that unsterilized 
intervention would impact the exchange rate similar to monetary policy by inducing changes in 
the stock of the monetary base which, in turn, induces changes in broader monetary aggregates, 
interest rates, market expectations and eventually the exchange rate. However, the efficacy of 
sterilized intervention is controversial, therefore the debate on the effectiveness of official 
intervention in the foreign exchange market mostly relates to sterilized intervention. If 
sterilization is complete then we should investigate the efficacy of the intervention in next step to 
know whether the SBP used the sterilized intervention to achieve the internal and external 
objectives simultaneously.  
1.5: Econometric methodology and data issues 
The data on net foreign assets (NFA) in domestic currency is adjusted for valuation changes due 
to periodic exchange rate changes which are not reflected as a change in monetary base. 
Similarly we considered the possibility of changes in reserve requirement of the central bank on 
domestic credit expansion. Estimation is done through GMM technique for the monthly data for 
the period 2001:1 to 2007:06. The choice of period is important as it covers the period of 
significant foreign exchange inflows and covers the boom period prior to the 2008 balance of 
payment crises.  This technique was chosen so as to take in to account the endogeneity problem 
between the changes in domestic credit and the various arguments of the reaction function such 
as changes in foreign reserves, inflation and interest rate. This is important as Kouri and Porter 
(1974) and Obstfeld (1982a) and many other have pointed out that the coefficient is subject to a 
possible sterilization bias. The source of the bias is the possible endogeneity of changes in 
domestic credit when central bank follows a sterilization policy. If capital inflow is 
systematically sterilized, the change in NDA will be correlated with the disturbance term in the 
NFA equation, therefore OLS estimates will be inconsistent.
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Foreign reserves of the SBP are used as proxy for Net Foreign Assets (NFA) of the SBP. NFA 
include liquid reserves and gold holdings of the central bank. Since gold holdings do not change 
periodically, all the variations in NFA can be attributed to changes in foreign reserves held by 
SBP. Therefore changes in NFA can be proxied by the changes in liquid reserves (LR) of the 
central bank.  Because exchange rate fluctuations entail changes in domestic currency valuation 
of reserves which are not reflected as a change in monetary base, the measure       take cares 
the periodic reserve valuation adjustment due to change in exchange rate [Obstfeld(1982b)]. 
     is the change in the foreign exchange reserves of the SBP in terms of domestic currency.  
      is constructed as following.   
                                  
                    
                                                 
12
 For detailed discussion on sterilization bias, see Obstfeld (1982)a. 
Where    are liquid reserves of SBP and     means liquid reserves adjusted for valuation due to 
exchange rate changes.      is t-period average exchange rate of domestic currency for 1 unit of 
foreign currency.  Normalizing with monetary base (MB), we get 
                     
    is constructed by deducting      from monetary base     according to the method of 
Leiderman (1984). So change in domestic credit is constructed as following. 
                     
However, the change in net domestic assets does not provide a complete picture of the stance of 
the domestic credit policy of the central bank.  The variation in reserve requirements on banks 
has important implications in domestic credit expansion.  The change in domestic credit should 
therefore be defined as the increase in net domestic assets minus the reserve impounded by any 
increase in required reserves. Following [Obstfeld(1982b)], this later component can be  
calculated as following. 
                                       
However, since there is no change in reserve requirement during the period understudy (2001:1 
to 2006:8) except the 2
nd
 last month i.e., July 2006, we decided not to adjust the data for this (see 
Table 1.E in Annexure for Changes in Cash Reserve Requirement by SBP).   
Indicative domestic short term interest rates    are the call money rate. Inflation variable 
       is calculated using monthly CPI on change from previous month basis. 
                            
                    
Data on Industrial Production Index (     is taken from Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) 
publications to proxy the real sector activity.
 
To calculate the output gap, we used the HP filter 
on IPI to get its permanent component. 
                    
Data on monetary base      and call money rate (             is taken from IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics.  Data on liquid reserves    is taken from the SBP publications. 
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Figure 1.2: Plots of Data 
The ADF unit root test in Table 1.1 found that for all variables except        , we can reject 
the hypothesis of unit root.   
 Table 1.1: Unit Root Test Results 
    ADF    Conclusion 
1    (Domestic credit) -8.8241* [0] none No unit root 
2   (Foreign Reserves) -1.8903*** 
 
[2] 
none 
No unit root 
3 
     (Industrial output 
gap) -8.3126* [0] 
none 
No unit root 
5       (Monthly inflation) -2.1585** [2] none No unit root 
6         (Call money rate) -0.7427 [1] none  unit root 
*significant at 1 %; **: significant at 5%; *** significant at 10% 
ADF Test critical values: 1% level  -2.596160 
 5% level  -1.945199 
 10% level  -1.613948 
Lag selection Automatic through Schwarz Information Criterion 
 
Information contained in monthly data may be limited, owing to strong seasonal variation.  The 
presence of seasonal variation in the data can severely restrict firm conclusions about the 
interaction of variables.  The degree of seasonality in the data was examined by carrying out a 
simple F-test by regressing each variable on monthly seasonal dummies.  The null hypothesis 
implied no seasonality. (All coefficients of the seasonal dummies are simultaneously tested 
zero), while rejection of null implied the presence of seasonality in data.  The test strongly 
supports the null hypothesis of no seasonality in the data.  Therefore subsequent estimation will 
not contain seasonal dummies.   
1.6: Empirical Evidence and policy implications 
We have chosen GMM technique for estimation of the equation (10) owing to endogeneity 
problem between variables. The estimation yielded intuitively appealing results
1314
. The J-
statistic reported at the bottom of the Table 1.2 is the minimized value of the objective function. 
                                                 
13
 The variable on output gap in constructed using HP-Filter. However, applying HP filter could result in over 
smoothing of the true output gap. To check the robustness of result, we also estimated this regression using output 
gap derived through using simple linear trend. The results reported in Table 1.F of Annexure, show that they are 
robust and do not change with the output gap calculated through linear trend.   
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 We estimated the equation with intercept too.  But it turned out to be statistically insignificant.  
A simple application of the J-statistic is to test the validity of over identifying restrictions when 
we have more instruments than parameters to estimate. 
Table1.2: Estimation Results 
       
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
R -0.699278 0.040160 -17.41230 0.0000 
IPGAP -0.001619 0.000283 -5.721525 0.0000 
Inf_m 0.501180 0.109375 4.582220 0.0000 
d(cmr(-1)) 0.001634 0.000694 2.356078 0.0221 
     
     
R-squared 0.457217     Mean dependent var -0.003102 
Adjusted R-squared 0.427063     S.D. dependent var 0.041285 
S.E. of regression 0.031250     Sum squared resid 0.052734 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.163511     J-statistic 0.226584 
     
     
 
Under the null hypothesis that the over identifying restrictions are satisfied, the J-statistic times 
the number of regression observations is asymptotically chi-square with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of over identifying restrictions. This value is 13.1419 with the probability 
equal to 0.997 means that the null hypothesis that identifying restrictions are satisfied is accepted 
in our case.   
The result does not support the hypothesis that the SBP fully sterilized its foreign exchange 
interventions. The sterilization coefficient turns out to be -0.699 (statistically different from -1) 
meaning that the SBP adopted a policy of partial sterilization or was unable to sterilize its foreign 
exchange interventions fully. More specifically, the SBP did not use domestic credit policy to 
attain domestic policy objectives while engaging in sterilized intervention in foreign exchange 
market to influence exchange rate.  It suggests that the SBP in the presence of managed floating 
exchange rate regime was only partially able to preserve its monetary independence.  This is in 
conformity with result reported in [Aizenman and Glick (2008)] for many developing countries.   
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Figure  1.3: Monetary Overhang
Domestic liquidity Desirted Domestic Liquidity 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan and own calculations
The vulnerable external account position; unsustainable debt, pressures on exchange rate, high 
fiscal deficit, low investment, weak infrastructure, excess capacity, absence of confidence on 
economy and a shallow financial sector were summed up in slow economic growth, high 
unemployment, low inflation at the start of this decade. This required some policy stimuli to 
restore confidence and economic activity.  Adhering to its commitment to bring down fiscal 
deficit, the government had limited room to provide any fiscal stimulus to boost economic 
activity.  Similarly monetary policy stimulus was inhibited by weak external account position 
and shallow financial markets since any effort to ease domestic interest rates would have exerted 
depreciation pressures on Pak rupee.   
The situation, however, became more favorable with the post September 2001 changes in the 
economy.  The massive foreign exchange inflows owing to substantial increase in workers’ 
remittances turned the current account deficit into a surplus in FY01 after FY73, allowing the 
buildup of foreign exchange reserves and appreciation of rupee. Parallel to these developments, 
the policy changes to bring down debt servicing cost also began bearing fruits.  Specifically, the 
external debt-to-GDP ratio trended downwards supporting both the current account and the fiscal 
position.  All these external factors led to an increased share of net foreign assets in the overall 
monetary expansion in FY01 and subsequent years.  To ward off the excessive pressures on 
exchange rate in order to safeguard the competitiveness of exporters and reduce import costs, the 
SBP allowed only a gradual increase in the value of rupee. At the same time, given the low level 
of inflation, the SBP chose to stimulate economic activity by following an easy monetary policy 
stance.  To achieve both ends, the SBP conducted measured interventions to pick foreign 
exchange from the market and partially sterilized (at least initially) its impact by withdrawing the 
resulting rupee liquidity.  
Mohanty and Turner (2005) discussed that in some circumstances the central bank appeared to 
be focusing on resisting currency appreciation as well as easing its monetary stance. If so, 
intervention would create no conflict with monetary policy and hence there is no need to fully 
sterilize these. It is because a non-sterilized foreign exchange purchase by central bank would 
resist the appreciation of domestic currency and at the same time leave the ample domestic 
currency in market to support expansionary monetary policy. For this they cited the example of 
south East Asian countries. The SBP reports and statements by the Governor at that time clearly 
indicate the need to loosen up its monetary stance to provide stimulus to domestic economy.   
However, after remaining subdued for some time period, inflation began to accelerate as the 
growth in aggregate demand outstripped productive capacity, underpinned by the excess liquidity 
in the system. The excessive monetary expansion during FY02 to FY05, due to partial 
sterilization, resulted in accumulation of monetary overhang to a large extent, complicating the 
efforts to bring down inflation in the later years (Figure 1.3).  The excess domestic liquidity 
worth almost Rs364 billion was left unsterilized in the system during FY01 to FY03.
15
  
Consequently, the domestic interest rates declined to a large extent and private sector credit 
picked up sharply in FY03 onwards and inflationary pressures began to shape up.  
Evidence suggests that less than complete sterilization by SBP was a combination of its will to 
leave liquidity initially and later to its inability to sterilize fully when it was required. Despite the 
low sterilization effort, the SBP had retired most of its stock of market related treasury bills 
(MRTBs) during FY01 to FY03.  As a result of this retirement, the stock of MRTBs with the 
SBP declined from Rs.196 billion at end-June 2000 to Rs.51.747 billion on August 2003 
reducing the availability of MRTBs substantially for day-to-day liquidity management through 
open market operations.  In addition, SBP was unable to device other means such as issuance of 
its own paper, to sterilize its interventions. Consequence of the resulting monetary overhang was 
evident in the rising inflationary trends since 2005. 
The coefficient of inflation 0.50 is significant, and contrary to expectations, is positive. However, 
this result is in conformity with the result arrived by another study by Malik and Ahmed (2010). 
Economic theory and SBP’s mandate of price stability suggest that the sign of coefficient should 
be negative. That means if inflation is moving upwards, the domestic credit by the central bank 
need to be tightened.  However, this anomaly can be explained by looking at the macroeconomic 
environment at 2001.  Economy was in recession and inflation was subdued. The availability of 
excess capacity in the economy initially helped economic recovery while keeping the inflation 
subdued for couple of years despite expansionary monetary policy.  However, inflation gained 
strength especially after 2005 and still persists.  
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 The excess domestic liquidity of a year was calculated by taking difference between actual and the desired M2 
flows.  Desired M2 flow was the flow which would have been consistent with that particular year’s inflation and real 
GDP growth. 
One important policy implication is that the central bank needs to be forward looking to know 
the leads and lags of monetary policy in the economy. The central bank needs to enhance its 
ability to forecast inflation. Also important is to note that despite SBP’s apparent tightening since 
2005, it failed to control monetary growth within desired levels due to excessive government 
borrowings and also due to lump sum foreign inflows as a result of privatization, which were 
only partially sterilized. That explains the apparent positive relation between inflation and 
domestic credit during the period under study. In other word, out of two objectives of controlling 
prices and helping growth, the SBP mainly focused on growth and less on the price stability in its 
objective function.   
The statistically significant coefficient (-0.002) of       (representing the output gap) supports 
the hypothesis that during the period SBP mainly focused on the economic growth. Importantly, 
this coefficient has plausible negative sign.  That mean SBP largely followed the counter cyclical 
monetary policy.  We can infer that monetary policy is potent in stimulating the economic 
growth in Pakistan through its impact on aggregate demand. The infusion of liquidity helped 
SBP to keep the interest rates at very low levels.  This not only helped reduce the government 
debt servicing cost to provide it fiscal space to spend on infrastructure project but also induce 
private sector to borrow.  This increased aggregate demand helped economy recover from the 
recession.  But more important is to realize that this increased demand brings with it the inflation 
which more than nullifies the benefit of any growth.  
In short, the coefficients of inflation and output gap also imply that it is very difficult for the SBP 
to focus on both its statutory objectives of growth and price stability.  It has to let go one to 
achieve other.  This lesson is learned by lot of central banks worldwide who now primarily focus 
only on inflation.  That does not mean that central bank in developing countries could completely 
do away with the growth objective. It only says that inflation should have bigger weight in the 
loss function of the central bank. It is important to note that there is consensus that price stability 
is important for the long term economic growth.  Price stability promotes long-term growth by 
providing an environment in which economic decisions can be made with less uncertainty and 
therefore markets can function without concern about unpredictable fluctuations in the 
purchasing power of money. High and unanticipated inflation lowers the quality of the signals 
coming from the price system, as producers and consumers find it difficult to distinguish price 
changes arising from changes in supply and demand considerations from changes arising from 
high level of general inflation.  
In its present form, the SBP Act appears to be outdated and inconsistent with international best 
practices.  Despite the fact that functions and role of SBP have substantially changed over time, 
required legislative changes in the Act have not been carried out accordingly. For instance 
prohibition or strict enforcement of clearly defined limits on lending to the Government and 
establishment of a consensus building mechanism between SBP and the Ministry of Finance is 
important. There is a need to abolish the system of automatic monetization of fiscal deficit by the 
SBP. The SBP Act should be changed to reflect that domestic price stability is the prime 
objective of monetary policy.  The analysis also reveals that monetary stimulus will result in 
inflation unless the output capacity is not enhanced accordingly.  While it is easy to increase 
domestic demand it is not easy to raise productive capacity to match with the surge in demand.  
Going forward, this fact should be kept in mind while devising monetary policy.  It is important 
because the price stability will bring growth not the vice versa.  
The coefficient of lagged call money rate            is 0.002. It is statistically significant but 
different from 1 and is of expected sign.  As mentioned in various SBP publications (such as 
Monetary Policy Statements for H1 and H2 of fiscal year 2008), SBP conducts open market 
operations to keep the overnight rates in a band close to SBP policy rate. This systematically 
increases domestic credit if current interest rate is higher than previous period rate. This means 
that SBP is also focusing on short end of the yield curve to transmit its monetary policy signals. 
But result indicates that this focus on short end of yield curve is more of a recent phenomenon as 
indicated by recent monetary policy statements.  In past OMOs were more focused on achieving 
quantities monetary targets rather than smoothing of short end of interest rate. If central bank can 
directly manage the short term interest rates, the unpredictability of money demand becomes less 
relevant. Instead the linkage between the short term interest rates the central bank controls and 
the broad range of market interest rates that affect investment and consumption decisions, as well 
as the linkage between the interest rates and the exchange rate becomes very crucial. Under the 
assumption that components of aggregate spending are more closely linked to movement in long 
term interest rates, monetary policy actions affecting short term interest rates are linked to the 
aggregate economy through the term structure of interest rates.   
Conclusion:  
In this chapter we looked into State Bank of Pakistan’s response to the foreign exchange inflows, 
for the period from 2001:01 to 2007:06, to strike a balance between competing goals of internal 
and external equilibriums to draw lessons for its conduct going forward. In response to these 
inflows, central banks usually intervene in the market in response to these inflows to keep the 
exchange rate stable for considerations such as trade competitiveness etc.  Reserves could be 
built but domestic money supply could also sour if these inflows remain unsterilized or only 
partially sterilized. Using a reaction function we tested the hypothesis that SBP fully sterilized its 
foreign exchange interventions. We have chosen GMM technique for estimation of the reaction 
function owing to endogeneity problem between variables. The result does not support the 
hypothesis that the SBP fully sterilized its foreign exchange interventions. The sterilization 
coefficient turns out to be -0.699 (statistically different from -1) meaning that the SBP adopted a 
policy of partial sterilization or was unable to sterilize its foreign exchange interventions fully. 
More specifically, the SBP did not use domestic credit policy to attain domestic policy objectives 
while engaging in sterilized intervention in foreign exchange market to influence exchange rate. 
The coefficient of inflation 0.50 is significant, and contrary to expectations, is positive. However, 
this result is in conformity with the result arrived by another study by Malik and Ahmed (2010). 
Economic theory and SBP’s mandate of price stability suggest that the sign of coefficient should 
be negative. That means if inflation is moving upwards, the domestic credit by the central bank 
need to be tightened.  However, this anomaly can be explained by looking at the macroeconomic 
environment at 2001.  Economy was in recession and inflation was subdued. The availability of 
excess capacity in the economy initially helped economic recovery while keeping the inflation 
subdued for couple of years despite expansionary monetary policy. The statistically significant 
coefficient (-0.002) of       (representing the output gap) supports the hypothesis that during 
the period SBP mainly focused on the economic growth. Importantly, this coefficient has 
plausible negative sign.  The coefficient of lagged call money rate            is 0.002. It is 
statistically significant but different from 1 and is of expected sign.  As mentioned in various 
SBP publications (such as Monetary Policy Statements for H1 and H2 of fiscal year 2008), SBP 
conducts open market operations to keep the overnight rates in a band close to SBP policy rate. 
This systematically increases domestic credit if current interest rate is higher than previous 
period rate. This means that SBP is also focusing on short end of the yield curve to transmit its 
monetary policy signals. 
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Units FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08
Real GDP (fc) %growth 1.7 3.5 4.2 3.9 2 3.1 4.7 7.5 9 6.6 6.8 5.8
Agriculture %growth 0.1 4.5 1.9 6.1 -2.2 0.1 4.1 2.4 6.5 1.6 3.7 1.5
Industry %growth -0.3 6.1 4.9 1.6 4.1 2.7 4.2 16.3 12.1 5 8 4.6
  Large scale manufacturing %growth -2.1 7.6 3.6 0.0 11 3.5 7.2 18.1 19.9 10.7 8.6 4.8
Services %growth 3.6 1.6 5.0 4.2 3.1 4.8 5.3 5.8 8.5 9.6 7.6 8.2
Inflation (period average)
CPI percent 11.8 7.8 5.7 3.6 4.4 3.5 3.1 4.6 9.3 7.9 7.8 12
Food percent 11.9 7.7 5.9 2.2 3.6 2.5 2.8 6 12.5 6.9 9.7 32
Non-food percent 11.7 7.9 5.6 4.5 5 4.2 3.3 3.6 7.1 8.6 5.1 13.8
Core -- non-food, non-energy percent - - - - - - 2.5 3.7 7 7.1 5.9 8.4
Monetary sector indicators
Monetary assets (M2) %growth 12.2 14.5 6.2 9.4 9 15.4 18.6 19.6 19.3 15.07 19.3 15.3
Reserve money %growth 11.9 6.5 7.7 25.1 7.1 9.6 14.5 15.4 17.6 10.2 20.9 21.5
Private sector credit %growth 15.9 17.0 14.2 2.7 8.1 7 20.9 33.5 34.4 23.5 14.7 16.5
Net budgetary borrowings from SBP(flows) billion Rs 46.4 -4.5 8.9 135 -31.6 -112 -249.2 60 155.6 135.1 -58.6 688.5
SBP 3-day repo rate (end-June) % per annum 19.0 18.0 13.0 11 14 9 7.5 7.5 9 9 9.5 12
KIBOR (6 month, period average) % per annum - - - - - 6.46 2.37 2.97 8.71 9.61 10.17 10.49
M2/GDP (mp) 43.4 45.1 43.6 36.6 36.2 39.6 42.6 44.1 45.6 44.9 46.6 44.7
Private sector credit/GDP(mp) 2.4 2.7 2.4 0.5 1.3 1.2 3.4 5.8 6.7 5.3 4.2 3.9
Fiscal sector indicators
Primary balance % of GDP 0.2 -0.1 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.2 1.6 0 -0.9 -0.1 -2.2
Fiscal balance % of GDP -5.3 -6.3 -5.1 -5.4 -4.3 -4.3 -3.6 -2.4 -3.3 -4.3 -4.3 -7
Total debt % of GDP 0.0 81.8 94.4 92.9 97.7 87.8 80.1 71.4 65.7 59.7 57.9 59.7
External sector indicators
Export billion US$ 8.1 8.4 7.5 8.2 8.9 9.1 10.9 12.4 14.4 16.4 17.3 20.1
%growth -2.6 4.2 -10.7 8.9 8.5 2.2 19.8 13.8 16.1 13.9 5.5 16.2
Imports billion US$ 11.2 10.3 9.6 9.6 10.2 9.4 11.3 13.6 18.8 24.6 27 35.4
%growth -6.5 -8.3 -6.7 -0.1 6.3 -7.8 20.2 20.4 38.2 30.9 9.8 31.1
Trade balance billion US$ -3.1 -1.9 -2.1 -1.4 -1.3 -0.3 -0.4 -1.2 -4.4 -8.2 -9.7 -15.3
Remittances billion US$ 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.1 2.4 4.2 3.9 4.2 4.6 5.5 6.5
Current account balance % of GDP -4.9 -2.4 -2.7 -0.3 0.5 3.9 4.9 1.8 -1.4 -3.9 -4.8 -8.4
Foreign direct investment million US$ 682.1 601.3 472 470 322 485 798 949 1,525 3,521 5,140 5,153
Portfolio investment million US$ 267.4 221.3 27.3 -550 -141 -491 -239 314 620 986 3,283 36
REER app(+)/dep(-) percent - - - - - 3.3 -3.6 2.6 2 1.9 0.5 -2.3
Foreign exchange reserves (overall) billion US$ 1.2 0.9 1.7 1.4 2.1 4.8 10 11.1 12.6 13.1 15.6 11.4
weeks of imports - - - 10.7 16.5 35.5 49.3 47.2 35 27.8 30.6 17
Table 1: Major Economic Indicators 
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Table 1.A: Economic Indicators 
  
Table 1.C: Balance of Payment (US$ million) 
  
Balance on goods, 
services and 
private transfers 
Balance on capital 
& financial account 
Balance on capital 
& financial account 
plus errors and 
omission* Overall Balance** 
FY92 -1346 1510 1476 130 
FY93 -3688 3073 3099 -589 
FY94 -1965 3471 3550 1585 
FY95 -2484 2797 2722 238 
FY96 -4575 4195 4144 -431 
FY97 -3846 2748 2814 -1032 
FY98 -1921 1268 1615 -306 
FY99 -2819 -1315 -323 -3142 
FY00 -1931 -2464 -1963 -3894 
FY01 -513 196 822 309 
FY02 1338 388 1316 2654 
FY03 3028 1113 1561 4589 
FY04 1300 -823 -601 699 
FY05 -1807 816 736 -1071 
FY06 -5683 6576 6576 1132 
FY07 -6878 10449 10608 3730 
FY08 -13866 8256 8359 -5507 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan    
 
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 
a. Net foreign assets 72.6 202.4 308.9 43.5 53.7 73.4 274.6 -316.4
b. Net domestic assets 52.8 23.5 17.7 363.5 421.4 372.9 383.7 940.4
1 Net claims on Government -60 65.7 -69.2 57.3 91.1 86.9 92.8 583.8
Budgetary support -46 57.8 -46.8 62.9 67.2 67.1 102 554.6
From SBP -31.6 -112 -249.2 60 155.6 135.1 -58.6 688.7
From scheduled banks -14.4 169.8 202.5 2.9 -88.4 -68 160.6 -134.2
Commodity operations -12.1 5.3 -26.6 -8.2 22 19.9 -9.2 28.7
Others -1.9 2.5 4.2 2.6 2 -0.1 0 0.6
2 Non-Government Sector 59.9 19 126.7 315.4 418.7 408.4 385.7 441.7
Private sector 55.6 53.2 145.9 325.2 437.8 401.8 365.7 408.4
Claims on PSEs incl. autonomous bodies 11.9 -19.7 -11.6 -2.9 -12.7 7.6 19.7 33
Other Financial Institutions -7.7 -14.5 -7.6 -6.9 -6.5 -1 0.3 0.2
3 Others Items 52.9 -61.2 -39.8 -9.2 -88.4 -122.4 -94.9 -85.1
A. M2 (a+b) 125.4 225.8 326.6 407 475.2 446.3 658.2 624
B. Reserve money 35.2 51.4 84.9 103.4 136.1 92.3 209.1 260.9
     NDA of SBP -2.5 -102.9 -243.4 52.9 144.7 30.5 -13.6 568
     NFA of SBP 37.7 154.3 328.3 50.5 -8.6 61.8 222.7 -307
M2 9 14.8 18.6 19.6 19.1 15.1 19.3 15.3
Net foreign assets -164 714.2 133.9 8.1 9.2 11.5 38.7 -32.1
Net domestic assets 3.7 1.6 1.2 23.6 22.2 16 14.2 30.5
Budgetary support -8.4 11.6 -8.4 12.3 11.7 10.5 14.4 68.5
Private sector credit 8 7.1 18.2 34.3 34.4 23.5 17.3 16.5
Reserve money 7.1 9.6 14.5 15.4 17.6 10.2 20.9 21.6
Table 2: Monetary Aggregates
(Flow in billion rupees)
percent change over last year
Table 1.B: Monetary Aggregates 
  
 
Table 1.D: Financial Account (US$ million)   
 Items FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 
Financial account -1,114 -2,423 -471 -1,335 446 5,830 10,145 8,135 
1. Direct investment abroad -37 -2 -27 -45 -66 -70 -114 -75 
2. Direct investment in Pakistan 323 485 798 951 1,525 3,521 5,140 5,410 
3. Portfolio investment -140 -491 -239 314 620 985 3,283 36 
4. Other investment -1,260 -1,932 -1,003 -2,555 -1,633 1,394 1,836 2,764 
Source: Statistics Department, SBP               
 
Table 1.E : Cash Reserves Requirements (CRR) 
With effect from Rate  as % of Time and Demand Liabilities 
19-Jan-68 5 
24-Oct-91 5 
15-Jan-92 5 
9-Feb-95 5 
18-Jul-95 5 
19-Dec-95 5 
1-Jul-96 5 
26-Jul-97 5 
22-Jun-98 3.75 on Rupee and 5 on Foreign Currency   
5-Sep-98 5 
19-May-99 3.5 
12-Jul-99 5 
7-Oct-00 7 
16-Dec-00 5 
30-Dec-00 5 
5-Jan-01 5 
22-Jul-06 7 of Demand Liabilities and 3 of Time Liabilities
#
 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan 
 
  
  
Annex 2: Results of regression using output gap derived through simple linear trend.  
 
Table1.F: Estimation Results Using Linear Trend to Calculate Output Gap  
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
    
  
R -0.702653 0.043340 -16.212460 0.000000 
IPGAP -0.001139 0.000241 -4.720181 0.000000 
INF_M 0.450824 0.131146 3.437561 0.001100 
D(CMR(-1)) 0.002421 0.000618 3.914734 0.000300 
R-squared 0.487851     Mean dependent var -0.003102 
Adjusted R-squared 0.459398     S.D. dependent var 0.041285 
S.E. of regression 0.030355     Sum squared resid 0.049758 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.133056     J-statistic 0.233127 
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